

Origins of *Danwei* Mobilization

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In their attempts to account for the Chinese Cultural Revolution (CR), the recent scholarship has increasingly focused on such issues as the relative importance of group interests⁽¹⁾ versus party clientelist networks,⁽²⁾ rational⁽³⁾ vs. institutional factors,⁽⁴⁾ and the relevance of “psychocultural” factors.⁽⁵⁾ More recently, it has been argued that these factors respectively represent different “types”⁽⁶⁾ or “phases”⁽⁷⁾ of the CR movement: the party networks account for the very early phase of the Red Guard movements and subsequent “conservative” movements, group interests best explains the brief phase of spouting of social interests, and “psychocultural” or “personality” analyses are most suitable for “rebel” movements.

While these findings teach us many previously concealed insights, there still remains important lacunae in the CR literature. Among the important areas that lack significant contributions are historical perspectives, organizational (grassroots) level analyses and cultural/cognitive approaches. First, it is incomprehensive that so far the CR scholarship has not made any serious and systematic efforts to analyze the movement from historical perspectives. After all, the CR was just one, though one of the largest and most violent, example of mobilization campaigns in the Mao era.⁽⁸⁾ We need to employ a more historical approach that considers major mobilization campaigns preceding the CR. Second, while most interesting studies on the CR have been done at the city-level and, to a less extent, at the individual level, we still lack significant contributions at the organizational level. To illustrate this point, it is suffice to take a major example: disagreements over how the organization of *danwei* worked as a medium of collective action during the CR. To take three views, the first stresses the role of patron-client networks within the *danwei*;⁽⁹⁾ the second presents an image of “social cellularization” or “compartmentalization”;⁽¹⁰⁾ and the third, directly contradicting the assumption of “fragmented and organization-based interests” made by the second perspective, proposed that the institutional structure of the *danwei* produced so-called “large numbers” phenomenon.⁽¹¹⁾ Third, despite rich cultural symbols and images that appeared during the CR, little efforts have been made to account for symbolic and cognitive aspects of the movement.⁽¹²⁾ By using recent contributions made by social movement scholars, we should look into social-psychological dynamics that “mediated between opportunity,

organization, and action.”⁽¹³⁾ Except for a recent pioneering work by Perry and Li, the field is still a “largely unexplored terrain” of the CR studies.⁽¹⁴⁾

This study attempts to address the first and second issues by focusing on the origins of *danwei* mobilization during China’s revolutionary war era, and only partly touches upon the third. In general, the *danwei* (work unit) is a set of organizational principles developed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to control and mobilize the Chinese populace under the circumstance of scarcity and need for rapid modernization. More concretely, during the Mao era the *danwei* not only provided the party-state an effective controlling device with its functions of the “redistributive center,” monitoring device, and party clientelist networks.⁽¹⁵⁾ But the *danwei* also gave the party-state powerful mobilizing structures through the medium of elaborate mechanisms of top-down mobilization. Since the appearance of Andrew Walder’s pathbreaking work, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism* in 1986, quite a few scholars have written on the control and “redistributive” aspects of the *danwei*. However, its role as mobilizing mechanisms have not been explored. Moreover, although most scholars on contemporary China take it for granted that Mao’s regime was a mobilizing one, there have been strikingly fewer works on the mobilizing aspect of the regime than those on the controlling side.⁽¹⁶⁾ It is therefore the purpose of this study that I treat two of the most important institutions of the Mao era—the *danwei* and mobilization campaigns—together in a systematic way.

This study assumes that *danwei* mobilization was originated in the patterns and organizations developed during the two mobilization campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1940s, namely, the Rectification Campaign and the Great Production Campaign. Those were the years nearly two decades of CCP’s revolutionary experiences materialized and a set of innovative organizations and ideas which Mark Selden called the “Yenan way” were developed.⁽¹⁷⁾ These ideas and organizations continued to influence the thinking and policies of Chinese leaders after the establishment of the People’s Republic. It is therefore assumed that the institution of *danwei* mobilization was also originated in this period.

Data used in this study come from primary and secondary sources from China, Taiwan, the United State, and Japan. The primary materials consist of three types: one is newspapers—by far the most important is the *Liberation Daily (Jiefan Ribao)*; the second is published memoir of CCP leaders; and the last is firsthand accounts of outside visitors in the Communist base area. The secondary materials include historical studies from diverse perspectives. These are: first, studies done by American and Japanese historians in the 1970s; second, recent monographs produced by Taiwan and Japanese scholars who used newly available materials from China; and, third, recent works by Chinese historians. These varied data from different perspectives were used so that any one-sided view of Chinese mobilization campaigns can be avoided—from both right and left.

Finally, it is necessary to note that this is not the study of the Cultural Revolution per se

but that of the earliest forms of Chinese Communist mobilization campaign, of which the CR constituted a part. It is my assumption that a better picture of the CR can be obtained by comparatively examining the preceding mobilization campaigns. The strategy here is to look into the CR from the vantage point gained from empirical studies of earlier Communist mobilization campaigns. Therefore, the question asked in this study is: what were structural and symbolic implications of the earliest Chinese Communist movement⁽¹⁸⁾ for the Cultural Revolution?

The Chinese Communist Base Area in the Early 1940s

In the early 1940s Chinese Communists were experiencing one of the worst crises ever since they started the guerilla warfare in 1927. In retaliation of successful attacks on Japanese forces launched by the Communist Eighth Route Army, Japanese troops in 1941 started the notorious “three-all policy” of “burn all, kill all, destroy all” to annihilate Communist bases in northern China. According to Japanese intelligence sources, the population of the base areas had shrunk by almost half from 44,000,000 to 25,000,000 and the Eighth Route Army from 400,000 to 300,000.⁽¹⁹⁾ The situation was made even worse by increased pressure from their United Front “allies”—Guomindang (GMD) forces. The GMD not only cut its subsidy for the Eighth Route Army but also greatly tightened its blockade on the Shaan-Gan-Ning (*Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia*) base area where the Communist headquarters were located.

Rampant inflation caused by the blockade and an increased tax burden on peasants compounded the economic hardship. While the cost of millet, the staple crop in the base area soared fourteen-fold during 1941–1942, the price of cloth rose even faster. The Communist government was forced to increase the levy on grain, which made life even more difficult for the beleaguered peasant.⁽²⁰⁾ In late 1942, Mao Zedong looked back the experience and said,

“We were on the verge of a situation in which we had no clothes, cooking oil, papers, or vegetables, soldiers had no shoes to wear, and officials had no blankets in winter. Since the Nationalist Party, trying to chock us up, suspended the payment and laid an economic blockade, we faced the most difficult time.”⁽²¹⁾

Another factor that worsened the economic situation and also had possible implication for the Party’s decision to launch the Rectification Campaign in the midst of the severe economic hardship was the dramatic increase of non-productive personnel in the base area. In the most difficult year, 1941, there were some 70,000 people receiving free supplies in the base area of Shaan-Gan-Ning border region.⁽²²⁾ Two related factors contributed to this sudden change in demographic configuration in a rural town. First, there was the influx of non-productive workforce in the CCP base area in the end of 1930s and the early 1940s. They were above all young “intellectuals” from coastal cities, who became disillusioned with the

GMD government or/and attracted by the CCP's patriotic appeals. Second, there was a concomitant increase in the number of officials both in the administrative organs and in schools. The extra burden of sustaining a large military and administrative presence became increasingly unbearable for the local economy.

It is against this difficult environmental background that Communist leaders decided to launch a pair of large-scale campaigns—political and economic—which is the focus of this study. To sum up the major environmental factors, these include: the economic hardship caused by the double blockade by Japanese and GMD forces; the sudden increase of non-productive personnel resulted from the influx of “intellectuals”; and the intense military pressures from the outside forces. As you will see, Communist leaders tried to deal with the emergency by, first, launching a campaign for the economic sustenance in which they tried to mobilize extra work and capitals of the non-productive personnel and local residents, and, second, by enhancing its internal cohesion to overcome the military and political crises.

The Rectification Campaign: 1942–1944

The Rectification Campaign was started in February 1, 1942 by Mao Zedong's two addresses, “Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature” and “Oppose the Dogmatism within the Party.”⁽²³⁾ In these addresses, Mao attacked “subjectivism,” “sectarianism” and “dogmatism,” which were alleged to exist in the Party. By these labels, he intended to attack liberal tendencies existed among new intellectual Party members and emphasize collectivism over individualism. More political reasons behind the rhetoric were, the “attacks on Wang Ming—Mao's major rival—and his sympathizers”;⁽²⁴⁾ “Mao's attachment to ideological unity within the Party”;⁽²⁵⁾ the struggle over two different leadership styles—“one, revolutionary, emphasized struggle and broad political participation, and the other, bureaucratic, stressed stable administration and the reform politics of the Second United Front.”⁽²⁶⁾

Whatever the political motives of Communist leaders were, however, it has now become apparent that this was only one side of the story. Recent historical studies have revealed that the Rectification Campaign was also closely linked to cadre examination—and most importantly to anti-espionage work.⁽²⁷⁾ It is inaccurate, and even misleading, to see the Rectification Campaign only as a thought reform movement. The more important—and violent—side of the story was that it was a large-scale purge conducted by Communist leaders by way of a mass mobilization technique. The violent nature of the campaign became even more apparent as it escalated and degenerated into the “Campaign for Urgent Redemption” in the late stage of the Rectification Campaign. My concern here is not to assess the nature of the Rectification Campaign per se but to see how the campaign proceeded at the *danwei* level and look for possible structural implications for later Chinese Communist campaigns in general. So let me now turn to two *danwei*-level cases of the Rectification Campaign.

Two Cases: “Wang Shiwei Incident” and “Zhang Keqin Incident”

The Wang Shiwei incident in May-June 1942 was the most important event in the early phase of the Rectification Campaign and had a large impact on the subsequent course of the campaign.⁽²⁸⁾ Wang Shiwei was a researcher at the Central Research Institute in Yan’an where he was actively engaged in literary work. As the example of “Flowers of Wild Lily” (*yebaihehua*) shows, he was especially active in criticizing privileges of leading cadres and “residuals of pre-modern social practices.” More importantly, he turned his fire on Luo Mai (Li Weihang), who was the vice-head of the Central Propaganda Department and at the same time the director of the Central Research Institute, and allegedly called him a “residual of paternalistic practices within the Party.” In March 1942, countering the efforts by Luo and other leaders of the institute to organize the leading group of the Rectification Campaign, Wang mobilized his colleagues and fellow workers and successfully carried out an election of the leading group.⁽²⁹⁾ These words and deeds, or in general his alleged tendencies of intellectual “liberalism,” “excess of democracy” and “absolute egalitarianism,” were regarded by the central leaders as serious deviation that needed to be reformed. Wang was singled out as a target of struggle by the leadership including Mao and Kang Sheng.

With a new directive from the above, Luo Mai restarted the Rectification Campaign within the Central Research Institute on April 7. By using the arguments of anti-“liberalism” and anti-“egalitarianism” reflected in the twenty-two rectification documents, he criticized Wang’s past words and behaviors, and tried to mobilize anti-Wang public opinion. From late May on, Wang was repeatedly exposed to public criticisms at struggle sessions of the institute. It was “activists” that played a crucial role at this stage of the campaign. During the sessions, when Luo alleged that Wang was an “anti-party element,” “activists” all at once began to disclose Wang’s past “reactionary” words and behaviors, and criticized him.⁽³⁰⁾ In June, it was revealed that Wang had had an acquaintance with “Trotskyists.” He was eventually asserted a “Trotskyist” himself and deprived of his party membership. It was said, however, that Wang’s acquaintance with “Trotskyists” was found out by the Party secretary of the Central Research Institute—i.e., Luo Mai—who was ordered by Kang Sheng to search his personal dossier at the Central Organizational Department.⁽³¹⁾ It was apparent, therefore, that Wang had been singled out as a campaign target *before* the “Trotskyist” issue was revealed.

The process of the Wang incident meant that once the Party leadership decided to target someone who they thought was a “liberalist” or an “egalitarianist,” they could purge him at will by ordering the *danwei* head to look for his past “improper” words and conducts. Moreover, communist leaders from this experience learned the “mass line” technique of rectification campaigns in which they ordered *danwei* heads to take responsibilities and, in turn, *danwei* heads seized majority by making use of “activists” and isolated the targets of struggle.

In November 1942, a “bizarre incident”⁽³²⁾ known as the Zhang Keqin incident took

place in the Northwest Public School (*Xibei Gongxue*). The school, which was an academy for intelligence agents under the immediate control of the Central Social Department, was designated by Kang Sheng as an “experimental *danwei*” (*shidian danwei*)⁽³³⁾ of the Rectification Campaign. Zhang Keqin was at the time a nineteen-year-old student but unfortunately was singled out as a “smashing point” (*tupo zhongdian*)⁽³⁴⁾ of the school for the reason that he was once arrested by the Guomindang special police.

He was questioned without sleeping or resting for three days but continued to deny the “charges.” But here the story took a peculiar turn. Despite his persistence for the last three days, no sooner did he confess “crimes” and expressed his intention to reform himself than he suddenly became extremely cooperative. The next day Li Yimin, the *danwei* leader of the Northwest Public School, mobilized all of the students and teachers and held a “confession rally.” At the rally, Zhang not only tearfully “confessed” all the “crimes” he allegedly committed, but also skillfully explained how he changed his thought from “refusing to make any confession” to “making a complete confession.” And in the end he expressed his gratitude to the Communist Party, which ostensibly helped him out of a predicament of being a GMD spy. This performance of an alleged GMD spy was said to move the audience. Some of them even came forward and made confessions that they themselves were in fact GMD spies and asked the Communist Party to help them out of the predicament.⁽³⁵⁾

There were many attendants from other *danweis* in Yan’an at the rally. Upon returning their own *danweis*, they began the campaign of learning from the experience of the Northwest Public School. To whip up the campaign, the *danwei* heads tried to find their own “Zhang Keqin” and bring up “confession models” (*tanbai mofan*).⁽³⁶⁾ Meanwhile, Zhang Keqin himself was dispatched to a lecture tour and introduced his experience to the audiences. A “confession model,” Zhang Keqin, was therefore made up and, as a result, there appeared one after another across *danweis* those who were wrongly accused of being GMD spies. Many of the victims submitted themselves and confessed the “crimes” after “fatigue interrogations” (*pilao shenxun*). But not a few others committed suicide in protest.⁽³⁷⁾

The Escalation of Campaign Violence

After the CCP Central Committee issued the “Decision on Proceeding with the Rectification Campaign” on April 3, 1943, the campaign became larger in scale and more institutionalized. To name only major developments after the “Decision,” first of all, a work personnel rally was held on April 9 and about 20,000 work personnel (*gongzuo yuan*) from all of the major *danweis* under the direct control of the Party Central Committee participated. In the following three months, a large-scale confession campaign proceeded. Under the “generous policy” of “generous measures for those confessed and severe punishment for those resisted” (*tanbai-congkuan, kangju-congyan*), those who “confessed” reached about 450.⁽³⁸⁾ On June 1, the Party Central Committee issued the “Decisions on the Methods of

Leadership,”⁽³⁹⁾ which formulated the “mass line” techniques of leadership. After July, when the Rectification Campaign degenerated into the so-called “Campaign for Urgent Redemption” (*Qiangjiu Yundong*),⁽⁴⁰⁾ the “mass line” campaign fell into utter confusion. *Danwei* heads were assigned quota set by the central leaders. The pressure to comply the quota led them to more severe interrogation and even to outright torture.⁽⁴¹⁾ In the midst of this situation, on August 15 the Central Committee decided on the so-called “Nine Provisions,” which put together the past experiences of the Rectification Campaign.⁽⁴²⁾ The provisions included: 1) heads take responsibilities; 2) heads themselves undertake tasks; 3) the link between the “leadership backbone” (*lingdao guban*) and the broad mass; 4) the link between general addresses and specific directions (*yiban haozhao yu gebie zhidao*); 5) investigation and research; 6) the clarification of right and wrong, and minor and major [faults]; 7) the redemption of those who deviated from the right path; 8) bringing up cadres; and 9) educate the mass. Since the Nine Provisions include many important features that reveal the formative processes of *danwei* mobilization, I will treat them again at a later section.

In mid-September, an “Anti-Spies Struggle Session” was held for ten days at Suide Teachers College. Among about 2,600 participants, over 280 people voluntarily “confessed” and more than 190 were accused.⁽⁴³⁾ In this so-called “Suide Incident,” it was reported that a GMD underground organization penetrated the organizations and offices—including the city mayor—of the entire city and developed eleven branches of the organization. The Suide Teachers College was said to be one of the eleven branches.⁽⁴⁴⁾ In October, Kang Sheng directed that the experience of Suide spread over the entire base area. By the time, the public sentiment that GMD spies penetrated everywhere in Yan’an and the entire Shaan-Gan-Ning base area was created. Across *danweis* the mass rallies of “Campaign for Urgent Redemption” were held, and “GMD spies” and “traitors” confessed their “crimes” one another. There were a *danwei* in which the intellectuals were all alleged spies and a village where most of the residents “confessed” being spies. In another school, half of the students were alleged spies. And there were a number of deaths across *danweis*.⁽⁴⁵⁾ In the base area, about 20,000 cadres and 140,000 mass participated the confession movement during the one-year period from April 1943 to March 1944. At many *danweis* in Yan’an, over 80 percent of the cadres were said to be targeted as “spies.”⁽⁴⁶⁾

Economic Mobilization

During the Rectification Campaign, CCP leaders were involved another large-scale campaign—the Great Production Campaign (*da shengchan yundong*, hereafter GPC). The GPC was first launched in 1939 in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region and later extended to other communist base areas. While the GPC continued with vicissitudes throughout the Yan’an period, the campaign reached its highest point when Communist leaders renewed their commitment on the production campaign during the economic crisis in 1941. The GPC

itself consisted of a set of smaller campaigns, which included the “organizational production,” the cooperative campaign, the “labor hero” campaign, and some other agricultural campaigns. My concern here is not the evaluation of economic efficacy of these policies but the examination of the processes and means by which Communist leaders mobilized local residents of the base area.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Accordingly, I will touch upon only those aspects that I think are most relevant to the origins of *danwei* mobilization.

To cope with the economic hardship of the early 1940s, Communist leaders tried basically two ways. First, they tried to mobilize whatever forms of capital resources existed at grassroots and organize them under the control of “cooperatives” (*hezuoshe*). One of the most publicized model *danwei*—the Yan’an South-District Cooperative (*Nanqu hezuoshe*)—characterize the process of the cooperative campaign.⁽⁴⁸⁾ The South-District Cooperative, originally a small inn, expanded its businesses by incorporating small private shops and all sorts of local capitals, and eventually developed into a multifunctional cooperative, which held more than twenty businesses under its control. The businesses of the cooperative ranged from production, services, and consumer to tax collection, the lending of wedding and funeral expenses, and so forth. The success of the cooperative was largely attributable to its economic flexibility and its ability to satisfy the needs of local residents. For example, peasants could join the cooperative by investing all sorts of capitals—from material goods to livestock and to human labor. The cooperative also provided peasants such essential materials as farming implements at prices substantially lower than market prices. It also set up an insurance fund for peasants to take out in case of emergency, assessed members’ tax in place of the government, and so on.

The mobilization was also achieved through education and propaganda. It is apparent from the words of Communist leaders at that time that they attached more than just economic functions to the cooperative organization. The cooperative was in fact expected to play a role of organizational means to do away with the traditional institutions and values. Mao explicitly made this point in his address named “Let’s be Organized,” in which he said, “it is the dispersed small-scale production based on family units that constituted the economic basis of feudal rule, which entrapped peasants into eternal poverty.” And it was “by way of the cooperative” that the Chinese people could overcome the traditional economic regime.⁽⁴⁹⁾ More concretely, to mobilize peasants for production, Communist leaders organized a variety of cultural and educational activities within the cooperatives.⁽⁵⁰⁾ “Study groups” were variously called “literacy group,” “night school,” “half-day group,” “winter school” and so forth. “Newspaper reading groups” were also organized to discuss “current topics.” Cultural activities such as plays, choirs, and indigenous dances were also used to raise the political and “scientific” awareness of peasants. In short, CCP leaders were trying to reorganize the grassroots “by way of the cooperative” so that scattered peasants—as well as their resources—could be mobilized for the production campaign.

Second, Communist leaders found a simple but very unconventional way to supply their

basic needs and, in turn, alleviate the burden on peasant producers. The “organizational production” (*jiguan shengchan*) was first started in the late 1930s by a few off-duty army units. When the economic crisis was greatly worsened in 1941, the practice became institutionalized and extended to all kinds of non-productive “organizations”—the Party branches, administrative organs, schools, hospitals, and so forth.⁽⁵¹⁾ The slogans at that time was to “set to work yourself and overcome the difficulties” (*ziji dongshou, kefu kunnan*).⁽⁵²⁾ All kinds of “organizations” were engaged in simple production such as raising pigs and chickens, growing vegetables, weaving winter sox and underwear, etc. To encourage other non-productive personnel to follow, the top leaders—including Mao himself—were reported to have been engaged in backyard farming.

Like other campaigns in this period, there were quite a few cases of well-publicized model *danweis*. Among the most publicized was Wang Zhen’s 359 Brigade, which deserves brief description here.⁽⁵³⁾ Wang’s model brigade first entered the “barren slope of a mountain called *Nanniwan* and started reclaiming the waste land in March 1941. The brigade was said to have achieved its self-sufficiency as early as 1943. Moreover, it extended its businesses in such areas as transportation, commerce, and even light industry. As a result, the brigade produced not only for its own personnel but also for general consumers under the trademark of “glory” (*daguang*).

The organizational production also went beyond the production of essential goods. Communist leaders equally stressed the importance of improving “mental life,” namely, educational and cultural activities. Much like the case of the cooperative campaign, various kinds of study groups and cultural activities were set up within *danweis*.⁽⁵⁴⁾ In fact, most of the leisure time of individual personnel was organized through these activities. In addition, mutual help and even a sense of family were called for to enhance the coherence of the organization.⁽⁵⁵⁾ To supplement the revolutionary cause and nationalist appeal, a slogan to the effect that “Regard your workplace as home and coworkers as families” was introduced to enhance ideological incentive.⁽⁵⁶⁾

Finally, to make the most of labor and other resources, competitive measures were used to accelerate the campaigns. For example, a typical “organizational production contest” proceeded as follows. First, the Party Center selected a few *danweis* and, in turn, the *danweis* conducted intensive experimental campaigns. The Party Center also closely monitored the proceedings and studied the “experiences.” Then, the second stage is propaganda campaigns. “Model *danweis*” (*mofan danwei*)—those *danweis* which achieved high productive records—were lavishly publicized in the *Liberation Daily* and other media and other *danweis* were encouraged to surpass those records. The Party also issued standards of the competition and the “agency production contest” was now in full swing. The enormous numbers of articles, reporting “new production records,” appeared day by day in the *Liberation Daily*. The “agency production contest,” according to a firsthand report, brought workplaces into an “extremely intense atmosphere” and “the use of labor reached the maximum point.”⁽⁵⁷⁾

Roles and Characters of Labor Heroes: Some Thoughts on Agency and Culture⁽⁵⁸⁾

The “labor hero”—or “labor model”—(*laodong mofan* or *laodong yingxiong*) campaign in China was originated in 1939 when Communist leaders adopted the campaign method from the Stakhanov campaign in the Soviet Union. After linked with the GPC in 1942, the campaign was greatly expanded and produced such well-publicized heroes as Wu Manyou and Zhao Zhankui.⁽⁵⁹⁾ In general, the major roles played by “labor heroes” can be summarized in three points: the leadership backbone of the mass (*gugan*), the bridge between the cadres and the mass (*qiaoliang*), and the model of the mass (*mofan*).⁽⁶⁰⁾ First, “labor heroes” were expected by the Chinese leaders to play a role of “activists.” “Activists” were those who were directly involved in mass mobilization at grassroots as the agents of the Party leaders. According to the Chinese Communist principles, the mass usually consist of three kinds of people—“those who are relatively positive, average, and relatively backward”—and “the ratio of these elements are in general smaller on the both ends and larger in the middle.” Leaders were to “build up a leadership backbone by uniting small numbers of activist elements, and, relying on the backbone, lift up the average and secure the backward.”⁽⁶¹⁾ In practice, “labor heroes” were engaged in such activities as reporting their experiences at mass rallies, organizing study groups, and even setting up a “model village.”⁽⁶²⁾ To “secure the backward,” “labor heroes” themselves attempted to persuade “second-raters” (*erliuzi*) to engage themselves in production.⁽⁶³⁾ Acting as “activists” on behalf of the Communist leaders, therefore, “labor heroes” played a crucial role in extending the Party’s mobilization efforts to the grassroots.

Second, despite the connotation of a Chinese word, *qiaoliang* or “bridge,” it is important to note that the roles “labor heroes” were expected to play were nothing more than that of passive agents of the Party’s intents. Here, a brief comparison of “labor heroes” with the local traditional elite, the gentry (*xiangshen*) is in order.⁽⁶⁴⁾ In general, the gentry are known to have functioned as a “broker” in the traditional state-society relations. Internally, they were very powerful, and often repressive, rulers of traditional Chinese communities, but, externally, they were also political brokers who, with independent power bases and interests, sometimes defended community interests from the encroachment of imperial state on behalf of their kinsmen. On the contrary, despite its disguise of popular “heroes,”⁽⁶⁵⁾ the roles expected for “labor heroes” was no more than those of passive agents whose *raison d’être* existed only insofar as they were useful for the Party’s mobilization efforts—and not for the interests of their constituent communities. In fact, Mao, in his major directive of this period, pointed out, “by continuously selecting activists (labor heroes), [leaders] have to replace inferior and corrupt ones among past backbones [with new ones].”⁽⁶⁶⁾ This statement made clear a precarious position of “labor heroes.” Their existence being dependent only on their outstanding performances and, more importantly, loyalty to the Party, “labor heroes” were under constant pressures of being compliant and competitive. This uneasiness of “labor

heroes/activists could have resulted in the “over-compliance” by making them excessively committed to the campaign targets. The unstable “status” of “labor heroes”/activists therefore might have led to the escalation of the campaign processes.

Third, “labor heroes” were role models for others to emulate in workplaces. There were three distinctive aspects in characterizing “labor heroes”: hardworking, the devotion to the Party, and traditional values. As Imahori pointed out, stories of “labor heroes” were more or less standardized.⁽⁶⁷⁾ In general, a “labor hero” had been a very poor man or woman before the Communists came to town. After the Communist arrival, he/she was liberated both physically and consciously and, by way of super-human work and innovation, and strong devotion to the Party and its revolutionary cause, achieved wealth and status. It is apparent from this standardized story that “labor heroes embodied the characteristics of hardworking and the devotion to the Party. The third feature was that once a person became a “labor hero,” he/she acted like an almighty paternalistic leader. “Labor heroes” were involved not only in production but only such in a broad range of work as organizing educational work, mediating civil affairs, collecting tax, directing public health, setting up schools, and so on.⁽⁶⁸⁾ According to Imahori, the image of “labor heroes” embodied an “Asian traditional value,” which revealed a “cozy relationship between Chinese Communist and traditional values.”⁽⁶⁹⁾ Whether it was “Asian” or not, there is no doubt that the image of “labor heroes” contained traditional characters. Quite contrary to the image of a “new socialist man,” therefore, Communist leaders at that time tried to mobilize local residents via the image of a quasi-traditional figure—hardworking, devoted, and paternalistic.

Emerging Patterns and Structures of *Danwei* Mobilization

The processes of the Rectification Campaign and the GPC reveal nascent patterns and structures of *danwei* mobilization. The major structural features that emerged from these campaigns are: the concentration of discretionary power in the hands of *danwei* heads, the use of activist agents, the emphasis on competition, the stress on “materials” and “investigation,” the extended use of small group activities, and the formation of tight-knit and self-contained organization. First, one of the most important consequences of the Rectification Campaign is the increased discretionary power of *danwei* heads (=secretaries of *danwei* Party committees). According to a Party document, which appears in the first chapter of “Rectification Documents,”⁽⁷⁰⁾ the past failures of campaigns were attributable to “the fact that each level of leading Party organizations and leading administrative organizations did not take it seriously to prepare and plan for organizing debate, and left it to general branches to carry out debate at will.” To remedy this deficiency, “first of all, the head of each branch of leading organizations must take this responsibility.” Secretaries of Party Committees, i.e., *danwei* heads, were made responsible for such tasks as preparing and planning rectification “study,” organizing study groups, “pressing” and investigating proceedings, and summarizing experiences.⁽⁷¹⁾ As the

examples of Luo Mai and Li Yimin, the heads of the Central Research Institute and the Northwest Public School respectively, have shown, such wide discretionary power as how and when “confession rallies were to be held, the assessment of “self-criticisms,” “confessions” and “autobiographies,” and the targeting of individuals, were fell on *danwei* heads. Consequently, once their power turned abusive, it was easy for *danwei* heads to become “small despots.”⁽⁷²⁾

Second, *danwei* heads were, however, also under constant competitive pressures. As the above examples have shown, certain patterns emerged during the two campaigns. The patterns can be summarized as follows:

(1) the designation of a few “model *danweis*” → (2) intensive experiments → (3) propaganda campaigns → (4) competition/quota-setting → (5) the repeating of the processes (3) and (4) until desired results were attained.

As the examples of the Zhang Keqin Incident and the “organizational production campaign” suggested, the patterns were similar in both political and economic campaigns. In fact, not a few *danwei* heads, who were simultaneously engaged in both the Rectification Campaign and the GPC, were said to have also pursued “high marks” in arresting GMD spies.⁽⁷³⁾ The competitive pressures imposed upon *danwei* heads by the emulative method and quota-setting practice was a possible reason behind the “overheating phenomena” (*guohuo xianxiang*).

The third aspect of emerging structures of *danwei* mobilization is the use of activist agents. By the so-called “link between the leadership backbone and the broad mass,” Communist leaders meant the leaders-followers relationship between “activists” and the mass. The above-mentioned “Decisions on the Methods of Leadership”⁽⁷⁴⁾ explains:

“The experience of the 1942 Rectification Campaign also corroborated the following. Namely, in each concrete case of the Rectification Campaign in *danweis*, it is necessary to form the leadership backbone that consists of the *danwei*’s highest administrative person in charge as its core and a small number of activists, and, at the same time, firmly link the leadership backbone with the broad mass who participated the study. And only by doing so, the task of the Rectification can be met.”

Danwei heads selected and nurtured a small number of “activists.” “Activists,” as the backbone among the mass, in turn played a role of “seizing “intermediate elements” and isolating “backward elements.” In practice, under the direction of *danwei* heads, by penetrating into the mass, “activists” collected “black materials” about the person in question and produce public sentiment against him. At mass “confession rallies,” as seen in the case of Wang Shiwei, “activists” also mobilized collective pressures against targets by inciting the

mass, which were inevitably accompanied by personal abuses both mentally and physically. The abuses in fact took place in numbers in the processes leading to the “Campaign for Urgent Redemption.” As noted earlier, the precarious position of “activists” may have caused the abuses. Other possible reasons behind the abusive behaviors of “activists” were personal ambition, grudges, organizational pathologies,⁽⁷⁵⁾ and so forth. Although it is very difficult to substantiate this point, there is no doubt that the “over-compliance”⁽⁷⁶⁾ of “activists” played an important role in escalating campaign violence.

Fourth, the emphasis on investigation and collecting of personal records was still another significant feature of the newly emerging patterns of Chinese mobilization campaign. The fifth point of “Nine Provisions” gave the definition of “investigation and study” (*diao cha yan jiu*): it is “to investigate and study each individual’s experience, dig up contradictions, and expose problems.” The personal dossier (*dang’an*) provided the most important means for the “investigation.” The materials collected during “criticism and mutual criticism” sessions, the first phase of the Rectification Campaign, were named “expert opinions” (*jianding yijian*) and filed in the dossier. The dossier also included individual’s “biography” which contained “work experience” (*gongzuo jingyan*), “class origins” (*chushen jieji*), and “social relations” (*shehui guanxi*). As the case of Wang Shiwei indicated, the dossier played a crucial role in cadre investigation by provide information about his acquaintance with “Trotskyists.” After the “liberation,” the personal dossier was extended to the entire population and repeatedly used during mobilization campaigns as a tool to find targets of victimization. It was indeed during the Cultural Revolution that the use of personal dossiers became one of the most disputed issues.

Fifth, “political rituals” and other small group activities were extended to the grassroots society. It was already noted by a scholar that during this period “political rituals were extended further outside of the Party and army to embrace all cadres (including non-Party members) and students and some intellectuals as well.”⁽⁷⁷⁾ As the example of cooperative campaign suggested, however, it was not only cadres and intellectuals that were involved in those “rituals.” But ordinary peasants were also absorbed in various kinds of “study groups” and cultural activities. In short, it was by means of these small group activities that the CCP could penetrate the grassroots and manage to mobilize their support.

Finally, the GPC contributed to the development of an extremely tight-knit and self-contained organization. The “organizational production” was designed to satisfy basic needs of individual personnel by setting themselves to work during their leisure time. In addition, there was an emphasis on educational and cultural activities to increase organizational cohesion. It is therefore not farfetched to assume that individual time and space shrunk away as a result of activities associated with the “organizational production” and the “cooperative campaign.” Individual needs were more or less met within the *danwei* organization and leisure time was almost entirely organized by small group activities. The tight-knit and self-contained nature of organization provided effective environment—easy communication and

cohesiveness—for the Party to exploit for the purpose of mobilization campaign.

Conclusion

During the two large-scale campaigns—the Rectification Campaign and the Great Production Campaign—in the 1940s, CCP leaders developed nascent patterns and structures of *danwei* mobilization. *Danwei* heads were conferred greater discretionary power in such important matters as the proceedings of campaigns, the targeting of individuals, and the assessment of “confession.” The increased discretionary power of *danwei* heads was, however, accompanied by constant competitive pressures. The competitive pressures were produced by emerging patterns of *danwei*-level mobilization campaign, in which practices such as modeling, experiment, propaganda campaign, and quota-setting played important roles. *Danwei* heads also relied on activist agents in such matters as “investigation,” the inciting of the mass, and the mobilization of collective pressures. But the precarious and uneasy circumstances of “activists” often led them to abusive behaviors. The emphasis on “investigation” and the personal dossier gave *danwei* heads a useful device to target individuals. Many innocent individuals were singled out and victimized by way of these techniques. Finally, the extension of small group activities to non-party intellectuals and other ordinary people produced a tight-knit form of organization. Along with the self-contained nature of organization created by the “organizational production,” the organizational structure facilitated the party’s mobilization efforts through close communication and cohesive organization.

One of the most important implications of the earliest Chinese Communist mobilization campaigns was the process of an “overheating phenomenon.” This study suggested two contributing factors to the escalating process: i.e., the competitive pressures placed on *danwei* heads and the unstable circumstances of activist-agents. Here it should be noted that the “overheating” of campaign processes occurred under the intense military pressures and economic hardship. The escalation of the spy hunting, for example, might have well been not so peculiar under the circumstances. However, it is more important to point out that the process was *institutionalized* during these campaigns and later became a well-worn practice of CCP leaders. That is, the practices learned during these campaigns were not only repeated after the “liberation” but also extended from the rural base area to the entire country.

Notes

- (1) See, for example, Stanley Rosen, *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton)*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982; and Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- (2) Andrew G. Walder, “The Chinese Cultural Revolution in the Factories: Party-State Structures and Patterns of Conflict,” in Elizabeth J. Perry, ed., *Putting Class in Its Places: Worker Identities*

- in *East Asia*, Berkeley: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1996.
- (3) Wang Shaoguang, *Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan*, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995.
 - (4) Lynn T. White, III, *Policies of Chaos: Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; and Xueguang Zhou, "Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China," *American Sociological Review* 58 (February 1993): 54–73.
 - (5) Elizabeth J. Perry and Li Xun, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997; and Anita Chan, *Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985.
 - (6) See Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*.
 - (7) Andrew G. Walder, "Collective Behavior Revisited: Ideology and Politics in the Chinese Cultural Revolution," *Rationality and Society*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July 1994): 400–421.
 - (8) The Chinese Communist Party first devised the mobilization mechanisms during their guerrilla years and, after its coming to power, continuously used the mechanisms during the entire Mao period. According to an estimate, there were more than one hundred "mass movements" for the 1949–1969 period. See John Gardner, "The Wu-fan Campaign in Shanghai: A Study in the Consolidation of Urban Control," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, p. 477.
 - (9) Walder, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution in the Factories."
 - (10) Sebastian Heilmann, "The Social Context of Mobilization in China: Factions, Work Units, and Activists during the 1976 April Fifth Movement," *China Information*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1993–94): 1–19.
 - (11) Zhou, "Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China."
 - (12) Cultural approaches themselves are not new in Chinese studies. See, for example, Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968; Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981; and Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. But they tended to depict Chinese political culture as essentially stable, uniform dependence of ordinary Chinese upon higher authorities. This view went well with the totalitarian model, which stresses the Party-state's ability to manipulate the mass.
 - (13) Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, "Toward Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 142–173.
 - (14) Perry and Xun. *Proletarian Power*, p. 67.
 - (15) Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
 - (16) For a few attempts to treat systematically the mobilizing mechanisms of Communist China, see Gordon A. Bennett, *Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership*, China Research Monographs, Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, 1976; and Charles P. Cell, *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China*, New York: Academic Press, 1977. While these works contains many useful analyses, their perspectives were unfortunately narrowed by their focuses on the "utility" and "democratic" character of Chinese mobilization campaigns.
 - (17) Mark Selden, *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

- 1971.
- (18) It should also be noted that the Chinese Communist movement was still a *social movement* (i.e., not an established political regime) during the period concerned in this study.
- (19) Quoted in Selden, *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China*, p. 179.
- (20) *Ibid.*, pp. 180–187.
- (21) Mao Zedong, “Jingji wenti yu caizheng wenti” (On economic and financial problems), *Mao Zedong Ji*, Vol. 8, Tokyo: Hokubo-sha, 1971, p. 184.
- (22) Xiaobo Lü, “Minor Public Economy: The Revolutionary Origins of the *Danwei*,” in Xiaobo Lü and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., *Danwei: the Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.
- (23) Mao Zedong, “Zhengdun xuefeng dangfeng wenfeng” (Reform in leaning, the Party and literature) and “Fandui dangbagu” (Oppose the dogmatism within the Party), in Jiefangshe, ed., *Zhengfeng Wenxian*, Xinhua Shudian, 1950.
- (24) Inoue Hisashi, “Henku (kounichi-konkyochi) no keisei to tenkai” (The formation and development of the border region [the anti-Japanese base areas]), in Ikeda Makoto, ed., *Kounichisensou to chugoku-minshu*, Kyoto: Houristu-bunka-sha, 1987.
- (25) Chen Yongfa, *Yan’an de Yinying* (Dark Shadow over Yan’an), Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1990.
- (26) Selden, *The Yanan Way in Revolutionary China*.
- (27) See He Jin, “Dui Yan’an Qiangjiu-yundong de chubu tantao” (A preliminary study on the Campaign for Urgent Redemption), *Dangshi Yanjiu*, no.6, 1980; and Chen, *Yan’an de Yinying*.
- (28) On the Wang Shiwei incident, see Li Weihai, *Huiyi yu yanjiu* (Reminiscence and Study), Vol. 2, Beijing: Zhongyangdangjiao-ziliao-chubanshe, 1986; Dai Qing, “Wang Shiwei yu Yebaihehua” (Wang Shiwei and the Flowers of Wild Lily), *Xiandai Zhongguo zhishi-fenzi qun: Liang Shuming, Wang Shiwei, Chu Anping*, Jaingsu-renmin-chubanshe, 1989; and Song Jinshou, “Guanyu Wang Shiwei wenti” (On the Wang Shiwei issue), *Dangshi Tongxun*, no.8, 1984.
- (29) Li Weihai, *Huiyi yu yanjiu*, Vol. 2, pp. 481–86.
- (30) Chen, *Yan’an de Yinyang*, p. 51.
- (31) Maruta Takashi, “Konichisensou-ki niokeru chugoku-kyousantou no jokan-seisaku” (The anti-espionage policy of the Chinese Communist Party during the anti-Japanese war period), *Shigaku-kenkyu*, Hiroshima University, no.199, pp. 88–111, at 98. According to Maruta, the Party secretary, under the direction of the center, was already investigating Wang as early as April.
- (32) Wang Suyuan, “Shan-Gan-Ning-bianqu Qiangjiu-yundong shimo” (The circumstances of the “Campaign for Urgent Redemption” in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region), *Zhonggong-dangshi-ziliao* 37, Zhonggong-dangshi-chubanshe, 1991, p. 209.
- (33) Yang Zhongmei, *Zunyi-huiyi yu Yan’an Zhengfeng* (The Zunyi Meeting and the Yan’an Rectification), Benma-chubanshe, 1989, p. 239. “Experimental *danweis*” are those work units that the central leaders chose for intensive experiments before they extend campaigns to a broader scale.
- (34) “Smashing Points” are the major targets of campaigns selected for the purpose of elevating mobilization campaigns to a higher and more intensive level.
- (35) Li Yimin, *Li Yimin Huiyilu* (Li Yimin reminiscences), Hunan-renimin-chubanshe, 1986, pp. 113–16.
- (36) *Ibid.*
- (37) Peter Vladimirov, *The Vladimirov Diaies, Yanan, China: 1942–1945*, New York: Doubleday, 1975, p. 135.

- (38) Maruta, op. cit.
- (39) Mao Zedong, “Guanyu lingdao-fangfa de ruogan wenti” (On some issues of the leadership method), *Mao Zedong Xuanji*, Vol. 3, Beijing: Renmin-chubanshe, 1991, pp. 897–902.
- (40) Literaly it means, “urgently save those strayed from the right path” (*qiangjiu shizuzhe*). The campaign was supposedly designed to salvage those who yielded to the trap of GMD spies.
- (41) Maruta, op. cit., p. 103; Chen, op. cit., pp. 107–127.
- (42) Zhonggong-zhongyang, “Guanyu shencha-ganbu de jue ding” (Decisions on cadre examination), *Nihon-kokusaimondai-kenkyusho chugoku-bukai*, ed., *Chugoku-kyousantou-shi shiryoushu*, Vol. 11, Tokyo: Kensou-shobou, 1975, pp. 502–508.
- (43) Jin Cheng, *Yan’an Jiaojichu Huiyilu* (Reminiscences of social life in Yan’an), *Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe*, 1986, p. 178.
- (44) See *Jiefang Ribao*, September 15, 22, October 1, 2, 1943 for details.
- (45) He, op. cit.
- (46) Maruta, op. cit.
- (47) On the GPC, see, for example, Takahashi Mitsuru, “Enan dai-seisan-undou” (Yan’an da shengchan yundong), I, II, *Nougyou-sougou-kenkyu*, February, April, 1977; Imahori Seiji, *Chugoku no minshu to kenryoku* (People and Power in China), Tokyo: Kenso-shobou, 1973; Peter Schran, *Guerrilla Economy: The Development of the Shansi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, 1937–1945*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976; Selden, op. cit.
- (48) See, for example, Bo Sen, “Nanqu hezuoshe gefenshe shi zenyang zuzhi qilai de” (How the branches of the South District Cooperative were organized), *Jiefang Ribao*, February 17, 1943; Gao Zili, “Xiang Nanqu hezuoshe xuexi” (Study the South District Cooperative), *Jiefang Ribao*, February 20, 1943.
- (49) Mao Zedong, “Zuzhi qilai” (Let’s be organized), *Mao Zedong Xuanji*, Vol. 3, Beijing: Renmin-chubanshe, 1991, p931.
- (50) Dong Chuncai, ed., *Zhongguo geming-genjudi jiaoyushi* (The educational history of Chinese revolutionary base area), Vol. 2, Jiaoyu-kexue-chubanshe, 1991, pp. 312–317.
- (51) Mao Zedong, “Jingji wenti yu caizheng wenti,” p. 276.
- (52) See, for example, Li Fuchun, “Fengyi-zushi, wei gaishan wuzhi-shenghuo er douzheng” (Fulfill food and clothing, struggle for the material well-being), *Jiefang Ribao*, January 13, 1943.
- (53) See, for example, “Jiji tuixing Nanniwan zhengce” (Aggressively carry out Nanniwan policy), *Jiefang Ribao*, December 12, 1942; Li Shijun, “Zenyang lingdao yu zhixing Nanniwan zhengce, Nanniwan quanbu gongzuo de zhanwang” (How to direct and implement Nanniwan policy and the prospect of entire Nanniwan work), *Jiefang Ribao*, April 24, 1943.
- (54) Li Fuchun, “Fengyi-zushi, wei gaishan wuzhi-shenghuo er douzheng.”
- (55) Zhu De, “Jianshe geming jiaiwu” (Build up the revolutionary assets), *Jiefang Ribao*, May 1, 1943.
- (56) In general, during this period ideological incentive took precedence of material incentive. To be sure, Communist leaders made efforts to increase material incentive of those engaged in production by, for example, switching the wage system to the piece rate in 1943. But considering the fact that the change was made under the circumstance of severe economic shortage, it is doubtful that the material incentive alone increased significantly the workers’ motivation. It is therefore assumed that ideological incentives such as family values, nationalism, and revolutionary cause played more important roles.
- (57) Zhao Chaogou, *Yan’an Yiyue*, Reprinted Edition, Shanghai-shudian, 1992 (originally

- published by Chongqing-xinminbaoshe, 1944), p. 83.
- (58) In this section, I intend to reflect briefly on the issues of agency and cultural symbols by looking into the roles and characters of “labor heroes.” This is an only partial attempt at this important aspect of mobilization campaign in that I explore only one side of the cognitive dynamics: the roles of agents and the cultural frames that Communist leaders tried to create among the people in the base area. I am fully aware that this more strategic side of cognitive process only tells us how and what images leaders tried to frame and impose on others, and that I need to look into how and what images ordinary people did actually conceive by interpreting those strategic frames of leaders. Unfortunately, however, the limit of materials and my ability precluded the exploration of the latter.
- (59) On the Wu Manyou Campaign, see, for example, Sato Hiroshi, “Sen-kan-nin henku no nouson-roudoueyuu to kisou-sidoubu: Enan-ki no taishu-rosen” (Rural labor heroes and the grassroots leadership in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region: the mass line in Yan’an period), *Chugoku-kenkyu-geppou*, No. 432, February 1984, pp. 1–21; Sato, “Enan-jidai niokeru Go Manyu moderu” (Wu Manyou model in the Yan’an era), *Touhou*, March 1984; Mo Ai, “Mofan-yingxiong Wu Manyu shi zenyang faxian de” (How a labor hero Wu Manyu was born), *Jiefang Ribao*, April 30, 1942; “Wu Manyu: mofan-gongmin” (Wu Manyu: a model citizen), *Jiefang Ribao*, May 6, 1942; “Kaizhan Wu Manyu yundong” (Carry out the Wu Manyou campaign), *Jiefang Ribao*, January 11, 1943. About the Zhao Zhankui Campaign, see Imahori, op. cit., pp. 307–311; “Xiang mofan-gongren Zhao Zhankui xuexi” (Study a model worker Zhao Zhankui), *Jiefang Ribao*, September 11, 1942; Deng Fa, “Xiangying shengchan haozhao, kaizhan Zhao Zhankui yundong” (In concert with production command, carry out the Zhao Zhankui campaign), *Jiefang Ribao*, February 7, 1943; Deng Fa, “Zai gongying gongchang zhong ruhe kaizhan Zhao Zhankui yundong” (How to carry out the Zhao Zhankui campaign in public factories), *Jiefang Ribao*, May 7, 1943.
- (60) Sato, “Sen-kan-nin henku no nouson-roudoueyuu to kisou-sidoubu.”
- (61) Mao, “Guanyu lingdao-fangfa de ruogan wenti.”
- (62) Sato, “Sen-kan-nin henku no nouson-roudoueyuu to kisou-sidoubu.”
- (63) Zhao, Chaogou, *Yan’an Yiyue*, pp. 215–219
- (64) Here, I don’t mean that “labor heroes” constituted or even began to form an elite *class* during this period. The purpose that I introduced the gentry as a subject of comparison is to contrast the characteristics and roles played by the two groups. On the characteristics of the gentry, see, for example, Chen Jinan, “Dentou-chugoku no kokka-keitai to minkan-shakai” (Forms of state and private society in traditional China), in Mizoguchi Yuuzou, et al., eds., *Shakai to Kokka* (Society and State), Tokyo University Press, 1994, pp. 15–36.
- (65) It was claimed that “labor heroes” were chosen by their fellow villagers through “democratic procedures.” However, it is misleading to the extent that there were also stipulations that required “heroes” to be only those of the “poor-peasant” origin and the Party’s active supporters. See “Bianqu zhengfu banbu xuanju jiangli laodong-yingxiong mofan-gongzuozhe banfa” (The government of the border region issued the methods of electing and encouraging labor heroes and model workers), *Jiefang Ribao*, September 4, 1944; and Imahori, op. cit., pp. 236–238.
- (66) Mao, “Guanyu lingdao-fangfa de ruogan wenti.”
- (67) Imahori, op. cit., pp. 307–311.
- (68) Sato, “Sen-kan-nin henku no nouson-roudoueyuu to kisou-sidoubu.”
- (69) Imahori, op. cit.
- (70) Zhonggong-zhongyang-xuanchuanbu, “Guanyu zai Yan’an daolun zhongyang jue ding ji

- Mao Zedong tongzhi zhengdun sanfeng baogao de jue ding” (Decisions of the Party Center on discussion in Yan’an and decisions on the address of Comrade Mao Zedong on the reform in learning, the party and literature), *Zhengfeng Wenxian*, Xinhua Shudian, 1950.
- (71) “Zhonggong Hanzhongju guanyu 1943-nian zhengfeng xuexi de zhishi” (The CCP Central China Bureau, Directives on the 1943 Rectification Study), *Jiefang Ribao*, June 5, 1943.
- (72) Chen, op. cit., pp. 314–315.
- (73) Chen, op. cit., p. 114.
- (74) Mao Zedong, “Guanyu lingdao-fangfa de ruogan wenti.”
- (75) Andrew G. Walder, “Collective Behavior Revisited: Ideology and Politics in the Chinese Cultural Revolution.” In this study, Walder explored the organizational mechanisms that led to the “escalation of violence” during the Cultural Revolution.
- (76) Ibid.
- (77) Martin K. Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, p. 33.